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“It is hardly necessary to point out that estimates are at best 
approximate. … Congressional appropriations, extraordinary in 
character, or failures to realize fully estimated revenues, are … influences 
which may operate seriously to derange all calculations. A conservative 
margin should, therefore, be reserved in forecasting definite results based 
on hypothetical calculations.”  
      L. J. Gage 
      Secretary of the Treasury 




 Feenberg et al. (1989) apply a simple regression-based method to 
test the rationality of state revenue forecasts. Using the same regression-
based methodology, we test the rationality of federal revenue forecasts for 
fiscal year 1802 through 2001. We find that Treasury forecasts of federal 




 The effective conduct of fiscal policy critically depends upon the 
properties of the revenue forecasts used to implement these policies. More 
specifically, fiscal policy is frequently used to promote macroeconomic 
stability, allocative efficiency, and distributional fairness. In order to 
conduct fiscal policy in support of these goals, officials require accurate 
revenue forecasts. Suppose, for example, that budget deficits (surpluses) 
are unexpectedly large due, in part, to inaccurate revenue forecasts. The 
resulting fiscal posture of the country may be inappropriate for the 
circumstances and may even exacerbate the conditions that fiscal policy is 
intended to help alleviate. 
 
 Likewise, the ability of officials to use tax policy to promote 
allocative efficiency requires accurate revenue forecasts. For example, tax 
policy experts frequently recommend broadening the tax base and 
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reducing marginal tax rates to encourage work, savings, investment, and 
entrepreneurial risk-taking. In order to implement such policy 
prescriptions, however, officials require accurate forecasts of their revenue 
consequences. Finally, officials also use tax policy to distribute tax 
burdens according to notions of fairness, such as the ability to pay 
principle. Designing tax policy to achieve distributional goals without 
jeopardizing other policy goals, particularly revenue adequacy, also 
requires accurate revenue forecasts. In short, accurate revenue forecasts 
play an important role in the development of sound fiscal policies.  
 
 The purpose of this study is to evaluate the quality of U.S. 
Treasury revenue forecasts; however, quality, like beauty, is in the eye of 
the beholder. For example, the preamble of this study suggests that a 
“conservative margin should be reserved in forecasting.” This statement 
seems to argue for downwardly biased forecasts. But, forecasts that are 
consistently biased in one direction or another may lack credibility. In 
addition to unbiased estimates, there may be other properties that may be 
desirable in revenue forecasts.  
 
 Accordingly, we propose the following three properties of revenue 
forecasts. First, the average forecast error should equal zero; otherwise, 
the forecast is biased. A forecast that is consistently biased in one 
direction or another will not be credible to officials and the public in the 
long run. Second, the variance of the revenue forecasts should be less than 
the variance of actual revenues. A forecast of revenues that is more 
volatile that actual revenues will not provide a good guide to fiscal policy, 
particularly stabilization policy. Third, the forecast errors should be 
uncorrelated with the forecast itself; otherwise, the forecast is not using all 
available information and could be improved. 
 
 We proceed as follows. In the next section, we discuss a regression-
based test of forecast accuracy and describe the data employed in this 
study. Then, we assess the rationality of U.S. Treasury revenue forecasts 
for the period 1802 to 2001 and for three sub-periods thereof that 
correspond to major changes in U.S. fiscal policy. We conclude with a 
summary of our findings and offer suggestions for further research. 
 
Assessing the Rationality of Revenue Forecasts 
 
 Future revenues are uncertain for a number of reasons: 
unanticipated fluctuations in business investment and consumer 
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spending, the future state of business and consumer confidence, war and 
peace, and political events at home and abroad. Additional uncertainty 
arises because the federal tax structure may change in the future. These 
difficulties are illustrated by the following passage: 
 
It may be useful to add a few general illustrations of the reasons for 
some of the small estimates now submitted, and of the intrinsic 
difficulties in attaining much certainty concerning them during crises of 
overaction and revulsions like the past and the present. … During the 
two years before the revulsions in commerce in 1819, and including that 
year, the sales of public land exceeded the unusual amount of nearly 
thirty millions of dollars, while in the following years they fell to only 
about four millions, or less than one-seventh. The system being changed 
from credit to cash may have cooperated in producing this result; though 
at the same time, the minimum price per acre was reduced, in order, in 
some degree, to counteract the effect of that change.  
   Levi Woodbury   
   Secretary of the Treasury 
     September 5, 1837 
     Reports of the Finances, vol. IV 




 Since forecasts can only be approximate, we propose the following 
three properties with which to evaluate the rationality of revenue 
forecasts. 
(i.) Unbiasedness: The expected value of the forecast errors 
equal zero.  
(ii.) Efficiency: The variance of the forecast is less than the 
variance of actual revenues. 
(iii.) Independence: The forecast errors are independent of the 
forecast itself.  
We say that a forecast is strongly rational if it exhibits properties (i), (ii), 
and (iii), and weakly rational if it exhibits properties (i) and (ii).1 While we 
believe that these three properties are desirable and consistent with 
generally agreed upon notions of rationality, we concede that an optimal 
forecast need not be “rational” in the sense described here. A more 
analytical approach to identifying the properties of optimal revenue 
forecasts would be to define a loss function in terms of the errors of the 
revenue forecasts. The optimal properties of the optimal revenue forecasts 
would those that minimize the loss function. In addition to economic 
objectives, the loss function could be extended to include political 
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objectives as well. Although this approach has merit, it is beyond the scope 
of the present study. 
 
 Following Feenberg et al. (1989), we use a simple regression-based 
method to evaluate the rationality of a set of revenue forecasts. More 
specifically, first we estimate 
 
 Ra,t = a0 + a1Re,t-f + ut     (1)  
  
where Ra,t is the actual revenues in fiscal year t, and Re,t-f is the forecast of 
Ra,t made f periods ago. Then, we use appropriate statistical methods to 
test the joint hypothesis that a0 = 0 and a1= 1.  
 
 Now, we intend to show that the joint test of a0 = 0 and a1 = 1 
provides a valid statistical test of weak rationality, as defined above. 
Greene (1990) shows that a0 = E(Re,t) – a1E(Ra,t-f); therefore, it follows that 
a forecast is unbiased if and only if a0 = 0 and a1 = 1. Also, assuming 
var(ut,Re,t-f)=0, it follows from (1) that var(Ra,t)=(a1)2var(Re,t-f) + var(ut). 
Since variances cannot be negative, if a1 ≥ 1, then var(Re,t-f) ≤ var(Ra,t). In 
other words, if the slope coefficient is less than 1.0, the variance of the 
forecasts is less than the variance of actual revenues. Finally, we note that 
least squares estimation of (1) imposes property (iii). In summary, the 
joint test of a0 = 0 and a1=1 is a valid statistical test of unbiasedness and 
efficiency of the forecasts or weak rationality. 
 
The Data  
 
 We collected U.S. Treasury revenue forecasts from annual budget 
reports for fiscal years 1802 to 2001. During this period, the government 
employs three different definitions of a fiscal year. Consequently, it is 
necessary to use a variety of sources to get a series of actual revenues that 
is consistent with the forecasts. Specifically, actual revenues for fiscal 
years 1802 to 1842 are obtained from the Report on Finances, 1929; the FY 
1976 Budget for 1843 to 1976; and the FY 2003 Budget for 1977 to 2001. 
The data used in this study are reported in a Data Appendix. Finally, the 
reader should be aware that the series of actual revenues reported in the 
Historical Tables of the FY 2003 Budget are adjusted to reflect the current 
fiscal year concept (October 1st to September 30th). Consequently, the 
unadjusted, actual revenue series used in this study and provided in the 
Data Appendix may not correspond to the adjusted series in the FY 2003 
Budget. 
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 In addition to various definitions of the fiscal year, the U.S. budget 
also employs different definitions of revenue. Currently, for example, 
federal budget concepts distinguish between on-budget and off-budget 
revenues as well as current-law and proposed-law revenues. In earlier 
years, U.S. budgets report revenues inclusive and exclusive of revenues 
from the operations of the U.S. Post Office and the Panama Canal. So far 
as practicable, the data series used in this study reflect a consistent 
definition of budget revenues. The data include all federal revenues, on a 
cash basis, including those due to the operations of the U.S. Post Office, 
Panama Canal, and other government enterprises, as well as revenues 
dedicated to trust funds. 
 
  Another difficult issue is whether to use current-law or proposed-
law revenue forecasts for this analysis. If we employ current law forecasts 
and proposed tax legislation was passed into law, then the analysis may 
be biased. Likewise, the analysis may be biased if we use proposed law 
revenue forecasts and the proposed tax legislation is not passed into law. 
We use proposed-law forecasts under the assumption that proposed 
changes to the tax code are, more often than not, adopted into law. It 
seems reasonable to assume - despite recent experience to the contrary – 
that an administration’s revenue targets will be honored, even if the 
Congress makes major changes to the legislation.  
 
 Finally, there are twelve (12) observations in the revenue forecast 
series with missing values. In five (5) instances, the Treasury did not 
undertake (nut) forecasts, and in seven (7) cases the budget documents are 
not available (na) in local libraries. Missing values are indicated in the 
Data Appendix by nut and na, as the case may be. Observations with 
missing values raise another issue: what to do with them. One strategy 
that leaps to mind is simply to set missing values equal to actual revenue. 
For such observations, however, there would be no forecast error by 
construction. Consequently, this approach may bias the analysis. 
Accordingly, we elect to drop missing observations. Thus, we are left with 
188 observations. 




Means and Standard Deviations 









1863 - 1941 1,891 (2,1270) 
1,753 
(2,039) 74 
1942 - 2001 498,300 (564,700) 
472,500 
(502,700) 60 
1802 - 2001 159,800 (393,200) 
151,500 
(358,100) 188 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
 
 In addition to the time period from fiscal year 1802 to 2001, we also 
evaluate the rationality of revenue forecasts for three sub-periods: FY 
1802 - 1861, FY 1863 - 1941, and FY 1942 - 2001. These sub-periods are 
chosen because they correspond to major changes in fiscal policy. 
Specifically, the size of the federal government grew dramatically during 
and after the Civil War and, again, during and after World War II. 
Between 1861 and 1863, federal revenues grow from $49.860 million to 
$123.861 million, or by 148 percent. Similarly, between 1941 and 1943, 
federal revenues grow from $8.263 billion to $13.677 billion, or by 
approximately 65 percent. The difference in these fiscal regimes also is 
evident in Table 1, which shows the means and standard deviations of the 
data for each period. During the 1802 – 1861 period, average revenue is 
approximately $31 million; $1.89 billion for 1863 – 1941; and $159.8 
billion for 1942 – 2001.  
 
 Table 1 also provides some interesting insight into important 
characteristics of Treasury revenue forecasts. Simple observation suggests 
that the means of the forecasts are less than the means of actual revenues 
for all four series, but we would like to know if they are statistically 
significantly different. We compute a conventional test for the difference 
between two means for the pairs in Table 1. Except for the 1942-2001 
series, we reject the hypothesis that the mean of actual revenues is 
greater than or equal to the mean of the forecasts. In other words, the 
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revenue forecasts for 1802-1861 and 1863-1941 exhibit a downward bias; 
the forecasts for 1942-2001 do not. 
 
 As previously discussed, we also can perform a test of the efficiency 
of the revenue forecasts. If actual revenues and the revenue forecasts are 
drawn from two populations that are normally distributed and if the 
population variances are equal, then the ratio of the sample variances 
follows the F distribution. Although the assumption of normality may be 
unrealistic in this setting, we perform this test pair-wise on the variances 
of the four series.  In all four cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the variance of the forecasts is less than or equal to the variance of 
actual revenues; in other words, we cannot reject H0: var(Re,t-f) ≤ var(Ra,t). 
This result is reassuring. One could imagine trying to conduct 
stabilization policy using revenue forecasts with a variance greater than 
that of the actual realizations. 
 
 While such evidence certainly provides insight into important 
characteristics of Treasury revenue forecasts, we turn now to our 
regression-based test of weak rationality. 
 
Are Treasury Revenue Forecasts Rational? 
 
 As described above, we regress actual revenues on a constant and 
revenue forecasts, in levels. Finally, and as previously noted, this 
foregoing analysis is in levels. We also conducted the analysis in 
percentages. In this case, we reject weak rationality of the forecasts for the 
period 1802-2001 and for all three sub-periods. We believe that estimating 
the model in percentage changes is a higher hurdle, than estimating the 
model in percentages.  
 
 Two examples, summarized in Table 2, help to illustrate the 
reasoning behind this conclusion. Table 2 shows two forecasts. Forecast 1 
in Table 3 switches from period-to-period from 2-units below and 2-units 
above the actual value, but Forecast 2 is 2-units above the actual value in 
each period. We suppose that Forecast 1 would strike most people as 
unbiased and Forecast 2 as biased. 
 
 Columns 5-8 of Table 2 show the forecast errors for each forecast 
computed in levels and in first differences, and the last row of Table 3 
shows the corresponding average forecast error. A forecast is unbiased in 
levels if the average forecast error equals zero and unbiased in first-
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differences if the average forecast error equals 1.0. Table 3 clearly shows 
that Forecast 1 is unbiased in levels (average=0), but biased upward in 
first differences (average = 1.03). In contrast, forecast 2 is biased in levels 
(average = -2), but unbiased in first differences. In other words, using first-
differences to evaluate the forecasts leads to counter-intuitive conclusions. 




Comparing Two Measures of Computing Forecast Errors 
 
Forecast Forecast Errors Period Actual 
1 2 Lev-1 Lev-2 ∆-1 ∆-1 
1 10 8 8 2 -2 0.71 1 
2 20 22 18 -2 -2 1.67 1 
3 30 28 28 2 -2 0.71 1 
4 40 42 38 -2 -2 - - 
Average    0 -2 1.03 1 
 
 We also use nominal values in the regressions because the forecast 
should predict the future real activity as well as future inflation. Using 
real values in the regressions would unnecessarily simplify the true 
challenge facing forecasters. Then, we test the joint hypothesis that the 
estimated intercept and slope coefficients are equal to zero and 1.0, 
respectively. If the revenue forecasts satisfy the joint test, we conclude 
that the forecasts are weakly rational. The results are reported in Table 3.  
 
 Before discussing the results of the regression-based test of weak 
rationality, however, we should briefly describe an important econometric 
issue affecting the estimation of (1). A common problem with time series 
data is serially correlated or autoregressive errors. Examining our data, 
we find that there are 9 positive runs – two or more consecutive forecasts 
that exceed actual revenues – and 15 negative runs. The average length of 
a negative run is 6.7, and the average length of a positive run is 3.1. This 
is clear evidence of autocorrelated errors, and an apparent preference in 
favor of downwardly biased forecasts. In fact, if we regress of the forecast 
errors on a constant and the forecasts, the estimated coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant. As previously noted, violation of 
independence of the forecast errors and the forecast suggests that all 
available information is not being used. Alternatively, this may be 
consistent with a political or bureaucratic constraint that favors negative 
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forecast errors to positive ones. Further research should explore the 
possible reasons for this apparent preference. 
 
 Even in the presence of autocorrelated errors, least squares 
estimates are consistent, but the estimates are inefficient. Consequently, 
inference based on least squares estimates is adversely affected. To test 
the data for autocorrelation, we compute the Durbin-Watson (DW) 
statistic for each series. We report the DW-statistic and the associated p-
value in the bottom row of Table 2. The p-value is the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis, given that it is true. Clearly, in all four 
series the DW-statistics provide strong evidence of autocorrelation. For 
example, the DW-statistic for the 1802 – 2001 series is 0.74902, and the 
associated p-value is 0.0000000. Hence, we compute Newey-West (1987) 
autoregressive consistent standard errors, which are reported in Table 3 





(Newey-West autoregressive consistent standard errors) 
 
Coefficients 1802-1861 1863-1941 1942-2001 1802-2001 















joint testa 0.01285 0.22164 0.1899 0.20872 











a The joint test that a0 = 0 and a1 = 1.  
 
 Beginning with the 1802 - 2001 period, we find that the estimated 
intercept is 0.52E+10, which is not very close to zero. But, the estimate is 
not statistically significantly different than zero because the standard 
error of the estimate is quite large as well. The estimated slope coefficient 
for this series is 1.0883, and the standard error of the estimate is 0.56E-
01. Assuming the slope coefficient is equal to 1.0, the t-statistic is equal to 
1.58 or (1.0883 -1.0)/0.56E-01, which is not significant at conventional 
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levels. In summary, the estimated intercept and slope coefficients are not 
significantly different than zero and 1.0, respectively.  
 
 Thus, the revenue forecasts of this period satisfy the conditions for 
weak rationality. Not surprisingly, this conclusion is also borne out by the 
joint hypothesis test. The p-value of the joint test for this series is 0.20872. 
In other words, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis, given that 
the null is true, is greater than conventional significance levels. Thus, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that Treasury revenue forecasts are 
weakly rational. The p-values of the joint tests for the 1863-1941 and 
1942-2001 periods are 0.2214 and 0.1899, respectively. Since the p-values 
are greater than conventional significance levels, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the revenue forecasts of these two periods are weakly 
rational. In contrast, the p-value for the 1802 - 1860 period is 0.01285, 
which is less than conventional significance levels, and thus, we reject 
weak rationality of the forecasts of this period. In summary, except for the 
1802-1861 period, the revenue forecasts satisfy the conditions of weak 
rationality. 
 
 Treasury reports to Congress suggest that eliminating the federal 
debt was a major policy goal during the early years of the U.S. The 
sentiments expressed in the following passage are representative of those 
in other reports during this period: 
 
It is evident that the possibility of thus providing for the payment of the 
interest of a new debt of thirteen millions of dollars, without recurring to 
new taxes, or interfering with the provisions heretofore made for the 
payment of the existing debt, depends on the correctness of the estimate 
of the public revenue which has been submitted. Although it is not 
without diffidence that the hope of such a favorable result is 
entertained, some reliance is placed on the solidarity of the basis on 
which the estimate is grounded. It rests principally on the expectation 
that the revenue of the ensuing year shall not be less than that which 
accrued during the year 1802. No part of it depends on the probable 
increase which may result from the neutrality of the United States 
during the continuance of the war in Europe, nor even on the 
progressive augmentation, which, from past experience, may naturally 
be expected to arise from the gradual increase of population and wealth.
   
    Albert Gallatin 
    Secretary of the Treasury 
    October 25, 1803 
    Reports of the Finances, vol. I (p. 266) 
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 The foregoing passage seems to reflect a preference for a 
conservative approach to revenue forecasting. Interestingly, in light of this 
apparent preference for conservative forecasts, the estimated intercept of 
the 1802-1861 regression is statistically significantly greater than zero, 
suggesting that the revenue forecasts during this period are biased 
downward. The apparent desire to reduce the federal debt, expressed 
above, may reflect a preference during this period for conservative or 
downwardly biased revenue forecasts. Briefly, policymakers of this era 
may have preferred unexpectedly large surpluses due to conservative 
revenue forecasts because they believed this posture would further their 
objective of reducing the federal debt. 
 
 Finally, it is worth noting that the estimated intercept and slope 
coefficients are closer to zero and 1.0, respectively, for the 1861 - 1941 
series, than for the 1942 - 2001 series. If one can use such patterns to 
evaluate the quality of forecasts, then it would seem that revenue 
forecasts of the current period are not as good as those of the pre-war 
period. This is ironic given the presumed progress in economic science, 
econometrics, data availability, and data processing. Without further 
analysis, one should be cautious about drawing any firm conclusions in 
this regard, but it would be interesting to explore whether differences in 





 Feenberg et al. (1989) use a simple regression-based test to 
evaluate the rationality of state revenue forecasts. They find evidence of 
downward bias in the post-war revenue forecasts of the three states that 
are the focus of their study. In contrast, we conclude that U.S. Treasury 
revenue forecasts satisfy the conditions of weak rationality. In the 1802-
1861 series, however, we find evidence of downward bias in the forecasts. 
We speculate that the emphasis on eliminating the federal debt may have 
resulted in a preference among policymakers of this era for conservative or 
downwardly biased revenue forecasts.  
 
 It would be interesting to explore whether differences in political 
pressure or differences in the stability of the tax structure account for any 
change in the quality of Treasury revenue forecasts in the modern period. 
Further research also should examine the rationality of federal 
expenditure and deficit forecasts. 




1 Feenberg et al. (1989) describe a strong test of rationality, but this test is 
difficult to implement because it requires knowledge of all information 
available at time t-f. 
2 The Newey-West autoregressive consistent errors are computed as 
follows:  
 
 V(A) = N(X’X)-1S*(X’X)-1 
 
 where: S*=S0(1/N)Σj=1to LΣt=j+1toN wjete t-j(XtX’t-j+ Xt-jX’t)  
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Data Appendix 
 
Fiscal Year Actual Revenue Estimated Reven FY ending Source of Estimates 
1802 15,287,838 10,600,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1801 
1803 11,399,493 10,000,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1802 
1804 12,189,256 10,400,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1803 
1805 13,960,723 11,750,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1804 
1806 15,964,918 12,500,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1805 
1807 16,873,166 14,500,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1806 
1808 17,521,226 15,800,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1807 
1809 8,280,106 16,000,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1808 
1810 9,935,899 nutb Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1809 
1811 15,010,737 12,500,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1810 
1812 10,365,301 8,200,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1811 
1813 15,008,564 12,000,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1812 
1814 11,866,995 10,100,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1813 
1815 16,637,089 8,200,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1814 
1816 48,489,665 33,400,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1815 
1817 34,072,651 30,650,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1816 
1818 22,695,336 24,525,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1817 
1819 25,808,041 24,220,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1818 
1820 18,986,131 22,000,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1819 
1821 15,631,950 21,500,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1820 
1822 21,349,316 16,110,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1821 
1823 21,670,670 21,100,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1822 
1824 20,578,971 18,550,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1823 
1825 23,146,913 21,500,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1824 
1826 26,707,837 25,500,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1825 
1827 24,490,896 23,150,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1826 
1828 26,423,525 22,300,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1827 
1829 26,534,958 23,140,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1828 
1830 26,694,644 23,480,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1829 
1831 30,524,071 23,340,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1830 
1832 34,123,886 30,100,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1831 
1833 36,565,438 24,000,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1832 
1834 24,615,585 18,500,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1833 
1835 38,422,750 20,000,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1834 
1836 54,235,108 19,750,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1835 
1837 29,055,856 24,000,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1836 
1838 30,541,295 22,800,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1837 
1839 35,967,406 24,000,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1838 
1840 24,023,637 18,600,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1839 
1841 21,267,886 22,580,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1840 
1842 24,523,048 19,150,000 Dec 31 Report on Finances, 1841 
TQ 1843a nac 9,050,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1842 
1843 12,598,927 nutb Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1842 
1844 33,558,662 18,850,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1842 
1845 34,259,948 22,300,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1843 
1846 33,187,166 32,160,302 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1844 
1847 30,376,078 25,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1845 
1848 40,290,990 32,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1846 
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Fiscal Year Actual Revenue 
Estimated 
Revenue 
FY ending Source of Estimates 
1849 35,913,319 35,100,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1847 
1850 49,103,424 35,400,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1848 
1851 58,969,908 34,450,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1849 
1852 55,031,343 nac Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1850 
1853 66,827,779 nac Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1851 
1854 80,055,927 nac Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1852 
1855 71,992,711 55,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1853 
1856 80,977,521 62,500,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1854 
1857 76,319,265 71,500,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1855 
1858 54,142,159 72,955,311 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1856 
1859 61,454,949 75,500,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1857 
1860 64,582,675 62,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1858 
1861 49,859,227 66,225,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1859 
1862 60,287,277 nac Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1860 
1863 123,861,081 95,800,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1861 
1864 277,065,025 233,025,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1862 
1865 348,270,764 nac Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1863 
1866 572,419,606 396,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1864 
1867 505,871,037 nac Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1865 
1868 421,930,684 436,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1866 
1869 388,257,923 381,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1867 
1870 430,135,014 300,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1868 
1871 403,360,990 393,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1869 
1872 396,022,294 320,418,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1870 
1873 356,734,947 359,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1871 
1874 331,449,828 nac Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1872 
1875 314,791,365 305,700,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1873 
1876 322,740,063 293,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1874 
1877 308,938,004 304,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1875 
1878 287,041,396 270,050,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1876 
1879 303,869,168 269,250,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1877 
1880 366,842,090 264,500,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1878 
1881 397,567,691 288,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1879 
1882 445,401,660 350,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1880 
1883 443,796,275 400,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1881 
1884 391,845,829 415,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1882 
1885 391,251,550 343,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1883 
1886 380,388,149 330,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1884 
1887 420,240,886 315,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1885 
1888 431,961,252 nutb Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1886 
1889 443,225,670 383,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1887 
1890 463,963,082 377,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1888 
1891 458,544,233 385,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1889 
1892 425,868,260 373,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1890 
1893 461,716,562 455,336,350 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1891 
1894 381,435,795 490,121,365 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1892 
1895 401,712,547 454,427,748 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1893 
1896 420,641,655 476,907,407 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1894 
1897 430,387,168 464,793,121 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1895 
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Fiscal Year  Actual Revenues 
     Estimated  
     Revenues 
FY ending Source of Estimates 
1998 494,333,954    412,227,077 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1896 
1899 610,982,005    482,874,647 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1897 
1900 669,595,431 610,958,112 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1898 
1901 699,316,531 667,773,254 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1899 
1902 684,326,280 716,633,042 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1900 
1903 696,105,165 712,020,630 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1901 
1904 684,669,709 729,767,664 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1902 
1905 697,101,270 704,472,061 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1903 
1906 762,917,229 725,590,515 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1904 
1907 849,445,392 nutb Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1905 
1908 793,340,570 nutb Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1906 
1909 807,882,881 878,123,011 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1907 
1910 899,640,373 825,340,712 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1908 
1911 939,712,735 672,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1909 
1912 939,353,220 680,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1910 
1913 990,730,756 667,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1911 
1914 1,018,807,733 710,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1913 
1915 981,658,992 728,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1913 
1916 1,094,592,237 735,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1914 
1917 1,448,850,911 580,200,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1915 
1918 4,520,770,417 1,005,550,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1916 
1919 5,000,714,025 4,097,715,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1917 
1920 7,136,351,649 4,942,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1918 
1921 6,048,008,320 5,420,000,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1919 
1922 4,588,368,578 4,859,530,000 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1920 
1923 4,379,873,608 3,345,182,750 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1921 
1924 4,456,989,920 3,361,812,359 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1922 
1925 4,207,235,642 3,693,762,078 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1923 
1926 4,568,277,376 3,641,295,092 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1924 
1927 4,811,544,877 3,824,530,203 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1925 
1928 4,731,869,433 3,772,753,077 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1926 
1929 4,733,166,496 4,352,495,287 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1927 
1930 3,841,000,000 5,605,152,047 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1928 
1931 3,190,000,000 6,404,314,700 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1929 
1932 2,006,000,000 4,085,119,927 Jun 30 Report on Finances, 1930 
1933 2,080,000,000 2,473,515,772 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1933 Budget 
1934 3,116,000,000 2,949,162,713 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1934 Budget 
1935 3,800,000,000 3,974,665,479 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1935 Budget 
1936 4,116,000,000 3,991904,639 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1936 Budget 
1937 5,294,000,000 5,654,217,650 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1937 Budget 
1938 6,242,000,000 7,293,607,197 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1938 Budget 
1939 5,668,000,000 5,919,437,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1939 Budget 
1940 5,925,000,000 5,669,320,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1940 Budget 
1941 8,263,000,000 6,150,760,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1941 Budget 
1942 13,667,000,000 8,971,735,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1942 Budget 
1943 23,282,000,000 17,825,090,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1943 Budget 
1944 45,408,000,000 35,406,695,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1944 Budget 
1945 47,740,000,000 43,425,380,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1945 Budget 
1946 44,239,000,000 42,854,752,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1946 Budget 
1947 44,718,000,000 32,717,465,945 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1947 Budget 










Source of Estimates 
1948 43,827,000,000 39,717,465,94 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1948 Budget 
1849 39,936,000,000 46,499,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1949 Budget 
1950 39,151,000,000 45,365,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1950 Budget 
1951 51,263,000,000 52,070,586,034 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1951 Budget 
1952 65,697,000,000 59,236,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1952 Budget 
1953 64,593,000,000 75,028,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1953 Budget 
1954 69,795,000,000 72,763,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1954 Budget 
1955 66,028,000,000 68,751,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1955 Budget 
1956 75,136,000,000 63,830,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1956 Budget 
1957 71,029,000,000 73,595,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1957 Budget 
1958 69,117,000,000 83,893,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1958 Budget 
1959 68,270,000,000 74,400,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1959 Budget 
1960 78,457,000,000 77,100,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1960 Budget 
1961 78,313,000,000 84,000,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1961 Budget 
1962 101,887,000,000 83,000,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1962 Budget 
1963 109,700,000,000 93,693,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1963 Budget 
1964 115,530,000,000 112,196,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1964 Budget 
1965 119,700,000,000 119,700,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1965 Budget 
1966 134,480,000,000 123,490,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1966 Budget 
1967 149,600,000,000 145,500,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1967 Budget 
1968 190,600,000,000 168,106,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1968 Budget 
1969 187,792,000,000 178,100,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1969 Budget 
1970 193,743,000,000 210,100,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1970 Budget 
1971 188,392,000,000 202,103,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1971 Budget 
1972 208,649,000,000 217,539,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1972 Budget 
1973 232,225,000,000 220,785,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1973 Budget 
1974 264,932,000,000 255,982,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1974 Budget 
1975 280,997,000,000 295,000,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1975 Budget 
1976 300,005,000,000 297,520,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1976 Budget 
1977 355,559,000,000 351,262,000,000 Jun 30 Fiscal Year 1977 Budget 
TQ 
1977d 
81,232,000,000 81,900,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1977 Budget 
1978 399,561,000,000 393,000,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1978 Budget 
1979 463,302,000,000 439,600,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1979 Budget 
1980 517,112,000,000 502,600,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1980 Budget 
1981 599,272,000,000 599,988,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1981 Budget 
1982 617,766,000,000 711,780,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1982 Budget 
1983 600,562,000,000 666,118,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1983 Budget 
1984 666,486,000,000 659,702,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1984 Budget 
1985 734,088,000,000 745,127,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1985 Budget 
1986 769,215,000,000 1,059,983,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1986 Budget 
1987 854,353,000,000 850,400,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1987 Budget 
1988 909,303,000,000 916,681,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1988 Budget 
1989 991,190,000,000 964,700,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1989 Budget 
1990 1,031,963,900,000 1,059,300,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1990 Budget 
1991 1,055,041,000,000 964,700,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1991 Budget 
1992 1,091,279,000,000 1,059,300,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1992 Budget 
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Fiscal Year Actual Revenues Estimated Revenue 
FY 
Ending 
Source of Estimates 
1993 1,154,401,000,000 1,165,400,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1993 Budget 
1994 1,258,627,000,000 1,252,700,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1994 Budget 
1995 1,351,830,000,000 1342,200,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1995 Budget 
1996 1,453,062,000,000 1,251,300,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1996 Budget 
1997 1,579,292,000,000 1,353,800,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1997 Budget 
1998 1,721,798,000,000 1,415,500,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1998 Budget 
1999 1,827,464,000,000 1,495,200,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 1999 Budget 
2000 2,025,218,000,000 1,566,800,000,000 Sep 30 Fiscal Year 2000 Budget 




1. In 1843, the U.S. changed the fiscal year from one commencing on 
January 1st and ending on December 31st to one commencing on 
July 1st and ending on June 30th. As a transitional devise, the 
Report on Finances, 1842 provides an estimate for the first half of 
1843, which is denoted here as TQ 1843. 
 
2. In certain years, the U.S. Treasury does not undertake (nut) 
revenue forecasts for the upcoming fiscal year. Sometimes this 
omission is not explained in the budget report, and, in others, the 
budget document attributes such omissions to the difficulty 
(impossibility) of providing meaningfully accurate forecasts. 
 
3. The relevant documents are not available (na) in local libraries. 
 
4. In Fiscal Year 1977, the U.S. changed the fiscal year from one 
commencing on July 1st and ending on June 30th to one 
commencing on October 1st and ending on September 30th. As a 
transitional devise, the FY 1977 Budget reports an estimate for the 
July - September 1977 quarter, which denoted here as TQ 1977. 

Copyright of Public Finance & Management is the property of Southern Public Administration Education
Foundation and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.
